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ABSTRACT 
MAST – Malicious Activity Simulation Tool – aims to support 
the conduct of network administrator security training on 
the very network that the administrator is supposed to 
manage. A key element of MAST is to use malware mimics to 
simulate malware behavior. Malware mimics look and behave 
like real malware except for the damage that real malware 
causes. MAST enhances training by providing realistic 
scenarios that are dynamic, repeatable, and provide 
relevant feedback. 
This thesis is meant to test the scalability 
characteristics of MAST. Specifically, we show that an 
exponential increase in clients using the MAST software 
does not impact network and system resources significantly. 
Additionally, we demonstrate and discuss how MAST is 
installed on a new network, and delivers feedback to the 
organization being trained. 
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During the summer of 2009, then Secretary of Defense 
Robert Gates directed the establishment of United States 
Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM).  The new command achieved 
Initial Operational Capability (IOC) the following summer, 
followed by Full Operating Capability (FOC) on October 31, 
2010.  USCYBEROM is: 
Responsible for planning, coordinating, integrating, 
synchronizing, and directing activities to operate and 
defend the Department of Defense information networks and 
when directed, conducts full-spectrum military cyberspace 
operations (in accordance with all applicable laws and 
regulations) in order to ensure U.S. and allied freedom of 
action in cyberspace, while denying the same to our 
adversaries. [1] 
A key directive in USCYBERCOM’s mission statement is 
to defend the DoD information network.  While there are 
many methods and techniques used to execute this task, the 
underlying foundation for each of those methods is 
training.  Training occurs at all levels and stages.  It 
must be relevant, continuous, and above all effective. 
A. NETWORK SECURITY AND INFORMATION ASSURANCE TRAINING 
As the use of computing devices, Internet 
connectivity, and cloud-based services rises, the need for 
more personnel trained to install, maintain, and protect 
these services also rises.  These developments are not 
isolated to business, government, or private communities.  
These same technological developments are also in demand 
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and in use by the U.S. military.  However, a key difference 
between military use and all other is the critical need to 
protect those services and the network they propagate over 
due to military’s national defense mission. 
Training for U.S. service members and DoD personnel 
varies based on location, experience, level of expertise 
required, and mission.  Options for training range from 
classroom-type training, computer-based training, and red 
team training.  Classroom training offers a lot of “hands-
on” experience in a controlled setting, while red teams 
provide a more realistic experience, as their training is 
conducted on the actual network the administrators 
maintain. 
B. SHORTFALLS WITH CURRENT TRAINING METHODS 
While our current training methods are effective, 
there are a few key shortfalls we wish to address with this 
thesis.  Red teams, for example, are finite resources that 
are in very high demand.  As more commanders understand the 
threat in the cyber domain, they want to ensure their 
unit’s preparedness by providing relevant and effective 
training.  While red teams are capable of providing this, 
the reality is there are not enough of them.  Additionally, 
the training offered through the use of red teams is 
dynamic in nature, which in turn can lead to inconsistent 
training results and feedback for the unit or organization 
being trained or evaluated. 
Classroom or laboratory training can also be effective 
and relevant.  However, a potential shortfall is the 
operating environment in which a trainee will train.  The 
computer systems and network to which they are connected 
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are often not be the same type of systems and configuration 
they would use on their operational network. 
C. MALICIOUS ACTIVITY SIMULATION TOOL (MAST) 
To address the shortfalls mentioned above we developed 
a software-based tool that provides relevant and dynamic 
training on the very network that the trainee will manage.  
The Malicious Activity Simulation Tool (MAST) was designed 
around a command and control architecture that allows 
training to be executed from a remote location with minimal 
impact on system and network resources. 
MAST uses scenarios, which are made up of multiple 
modules and commands, to conduct the training.  The modules 
are benign programmed behaviors that mimic the signature of 
real malware but do not include the “infectious” behavior 
that causes harm to the network and computing resources.  
All events and actions are captured and formatted into a 
report that provides the training unit and their leadership 
a view into their unit’s cyber security posture and 
preparedness. 
The current MAST architecture leverages the research, 
development, and framework of CDR Will Taff, LCDR Paul 
Salevski, and LT Justin Neff [1] [2].  Their efforts have 
led to the development of a prototype that is used as the 
foundation for experimentation in this thesis. 
D. OBJECTIVES 
In this thesis, we detail the properties of MAST with 
respect to scalability.  The intent of the tool is to 
provide training in an environment consisting of hundreds 
of clients.  In order to continue our development, it is 
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important we understand how MAST uses system and network 
resources while conducting training.  MAST must be able to 
train hundreds of clients while utilizing minimal 
resources. 
E. ORGANIZATION 
Chapter I provides a brief description of current 
shortfalls in network security and IA training.  
Additionally, a general description of MAST and its 
functionality is detailed along with the objectives of this 
thesis. 
Chapter II outlines previous research, current 
training methods and the work of Taff, Salevski, and Neff.  
Additionally, we provide a detail description of red teams 
and some historical examples of their use.  We conclude the 
chapter with a discussion of varying types of malicious 
software (Malware). 
Chapter III discusses our design considerations with 
respect to MAST and the test platform.  Specifically, we 
detail MAST’s functionality and architecture, and provide 
an example of a training scenario.  We provide details of 
the test platform’s hardware and software features along 
with a detailed discussion of training and the aspects 
involved in conducting training.  We conclude the chapter 
with an overview of the Host-Based Security System (HBSS) 
software suite. 
Chapter IV provides a detailed description of the 
assessments required to determine MAST’s scalability 
characteristics.  We discuss the installation of the 
software from a remote location on a network that does not 
 5 
have MAST.  Additionally, we show how MAST uses system and 
network resources when executing a training scenario.  We 
conclude the chapter with a discussion of MAST’s feedback 
and reporting capabilities. 
Chapter V provides conclusions and recommendations as 
a result of this experiment.  We give our assessment of 
MAST’s implementation of a large network and the 
utilization of resources by the tool.  We conclude the 
chapter with a discussion of future work to be conducted to 
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II. BACKGROUND 
This chapter details some of the varying cyber 
security and Information Assurance (IA) training methods 
utilized by the United States (U.S.) uniformed service 
members and Department of Defense (DoD) personnel.  
Specifically, we provide some insight into red teams, who 
they are, and how they operate, and other sources of 
training within the DoD.  Additionally, we discuss some 
malicious threat signatures and behaviors, and the proof of 
concept for our system, called Malicious Activity 
Simulation Tool (MAST).  
A. TRAINING METHODS FOR DOD NETWORK ADMINISTRATORS 
1. Red Teams 
In a 2008 interview, Popular Mechanics was given 
unprecedented access to a National Security Agency (NSA) 
red team member.  The interviewee revealed that the main 
task of the red teams was to provide “adversarial network 
services” to all units and personal within the DoD while 
ensuring strict adherence to their first rule of operation: 
“do no harm [4]”.  Within this context, and in general, a 
red team is made up of highly skilled and experienced 
personnel whose mission is to “anticipate and simulate the 
decision-making and behaviors of potential adversaries 
[5]”.  Red teams allow units to “train as [they] fight” by 
conducting their actions in the actual operational 
environment, while utilizing the same tactics, techniques, 
and procedures (TTPs) of a real enemy. 
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According to the Committee on National Security 
Systems (CNSS), a red team is defined as: 
A group of people authorized and organized to 
emulate a potential adversary’s attack or 
exploitation capabilities against an enterprise’s 
security posture.  The Red Team’s objective is to 
improve enterprise Information Assurance by 
demonstrating the impacts of successful attacks 
and by demonstrating what works for the defenders 
(i.e., the Blue Team) in an operational 
environmental. [6] 
The use of red teams is not limited to the computer 
security or computer network domain.  Red teams, who are 
sometimes referred to as an Opposing Force (OPFOR), are 
utilized for training, planning, and evaluating at the 
strategic level down to the tactical level.   
a. Contemporary Example of a Red Team 
Implementation 
One way in which U.S. Marine Corps infantry units 
prepare for operations in a hostile urban environment is to 
send their members through the Infantry Immersion Trainer 
(IIT) facility located on Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton, 
California.  IIT is a physical training environment that 
incorporates computer simulation technology to provide “a 
vivid and realistic virtual environment to prepare 
warfighters for a range of possible scenarios” [7]. The 
scenarios and simulations incorporated into the training 
program, known as TTPs, are integrated by a red-team-like 
entity. 
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b. Historical Example of a Red Team 
Implementation 
At the height of the Cuban Missile Crisis, 
President Kennedy established the Executive Committee (Ex 
Comm) of the National Security Council to provide him 
guidance and response options that were based on a careful 
analysis of the enemy and their potential courses of 
action.  Specifically, these red-team-like members were 
non-military members who helped provide information and 
courses of action that countered the recommendations of the 
highly influential military members on the committee [8]. 
c. Red Team Implementation within a Cyber 
Domain 
As stated earlier, the number one rule for NSA 
red team members is to “do no harm”.  This approach to 
training parallels the methodology taught in the E-Commerce 
(EC) Council’s Ethical Hacking and Countermeasures course.  
According to the Certified Ethical Hacking courseware 
manual, an ethical hacker is an individual “hired by 
organizations to attack their information systems and 
networks in order to discover vulnerabilities and verify 
that security measures are functioning correctly [9]”. The 
ethical hacker, or red team member, can then provide the 
organization or unit the status of their security posture, 
identify any weaknesses, and most importantly, identify 
remedial actions that can be taken to enhance security.   
The duties of the red team are limited to the 
time and resources available and the experience of the 
individuals on the team.  Like any other team or group of 
individuals working together towards a common goal, there 
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are varying levels of competency and experience among the 
individual members of the team.  The amount of red-teaming 
or depth of penetration a team can make on a respective 
network is unpredictable and not standardized due to 
variables associated with the particular red team, the 
network being probed, and the personnel administering that 
network.  Additionally, feedback to the respective unit 
being tested or trained is critical to its security 
enhancements, operational security posture, and most 
importantly mission accomplishment but it is often 
inconsistent and neglected. 
2. Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) 
Training Programs 
Another resource for cyber security and IA training 
for network administrators is the training products offered 
by the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA).  DISA 
offers a variety of computer-based and web-based training 
programs; instructor led training programs; and virtual 
training environments.  One course in particular, the Rapid 
Experience Builder (RaD-X) course, is designed to expose 
students to malicious software (malware) and provide hands-
on training with firewall log reviews, intrusion detection 
system (IDS) analysis and configuration, and anomaly 
detection using computer network defense (CND) tools [10].  
Trainees in this course are able to observe and interact 
with a variety of real malware in a laboratory setting.  
The laboratory environment is air-gapped, or isolated from 
all other networks and the Internet.  While there are many 
positive aspects to this hands-on, instructor-led training, 
there are a few shortfalls.  First, the cost of 
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transporting the laboratory for training or sending 
personnel to be trained can be very high.  Second, there is 
a very high maintenance cost associated with managing and 
maintaining the systems.  After each class, each system 
within the RaD-X environment must be “wiped,” that is, 
electronically cleared, and re-imaged to prepare for the 
next session.  Finally, for the trainee, there is no 
guarantee that the RaD-X computer systems and network 
topology mirror the operational network with which they are 
familiar. 
3. USMC Communication Training Centers (CTCs) 
Within the Marine Corps there exist three 
Communication Training Centers (CTCs), located respectively 
within each Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF).  The classes 
available through one of these CTCs range from tactical 
radios to Cisco routing protocols and concepts.  The depth 
of instruction on cyber security and IA is limited due to 
the limited resources available at each location and the 
additional military commitments for all service members.  
Like the RaD-X architecture mentioned above, the 
configuration and system design used in training often does 
not mirror what the actual service member will administer 
during an exercise or while deployed. 
All the training methods mentioned above are 
undoubtedly beneficial and critical to the continued 
security of our computer network infrastructure.  We 
propose that the incorporation of MAST will enhance network 
administrator training by allowing units to train on their 
very own operational network in a safe and controlled 
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environment.  MAST will provide consistent training and, 
most importantly, provide consistent feedback to the users. 
B. MALWARE 
Malicious software, or malware, is a general term used 
to describe software that is specifically designed to cause 
a computer system, its network, or peripherals to perform 
actions not intended by the user, or deny the user a 
resource resident within the computer or network.  In a 
2005 case study describing attacks against critical 
infrastructure, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) defined malware as: 
Programming (code, scripts, active content, and 
other software) designed to disrupt or deny 
operation, gather information that leads to loss 
of privacy or exploitation, gain unauthorized 
access to system resources, and other abusive 
behavior.  Examples include various forms of 
adware, dialers, hijackware, slag code (logic 
bombs), spyware, Trojan horses, viruses, web 
bugs, and worms. [11] 
The impact of malware on a computer system can range from 
harmless and annoying to severely devastating and damaging.  
Advertising software (adware) or spam e-mails, while 
inconvenient, will have little to no impact on the system’s 
resources and services.  A Trojan horse, conversely, could 
give a hacker complete access to a system at the 
administrator level, thereby compromising the 
confidentiality, integrity, or accessibility of files and 
resources located within the system. 
For the scope of this thesis, and MAST in general, the 
term “malware” will refer to those exploits and their 
behaviors that can cause catastrophic damages or deny the 
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end user the ability to accomplish the mission.  Specific 
types of malware behavior MAST will simulate include, but 
may not be limited to, worms, botnets, and viruses.  
1. Worms 
According to the Froehlich/Kent Encyclopedia of 
Telecommunications, a worm is defined as “self-replicating 
programs that spread with no human intervention after they 
are started” [9].  Gu et al. identify three characteristics 
common to most Internet worms [12]: 
• The first characteristic deals with the volume 
and type of traffic generated by an Internet 
worm.  A worm is more susceptible to 
identification based on its patterns and 
signatures.  Since worms are self-replicating, 
they do not evolve or change as they propagate.  
A worm’s uniform characteristics make it easier 
to detect with network traffic analysis software, 
such as Wireshark and TCPDump. 
•  A second characteristic deals with the worm’s 
scanning behavior.  Most Internet worms will use 
a pseudo-random search algorithm to discover open 
ports on a vulnerable system.  A worm with this 
behavior will attempt to connect to numerous 
closed ports, which will result in the same 
number of failed connections.  A brief analysis 
of these failed connections could reveal the 
presence of a worm. 
• The final characteristic is a noticeable increase 
in system resource utilization.  The host uses a 
lot of resources responding to the initial 
scanning done by a worm, followed by a further 
depletion of resources to find more vulnerable 
systems. 
The scanning and propagation features of an Internet 
worm are normally only part of its behavior.  Most malware 
carry or deliver some sort of malicious payload that can be  
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used to capture sensitive information, report back to a 
base station, or in the worst case, corrupt or delete 
essential system files. 
Cornell University student, Robert Morris, released 
the first known instance of an Internet worm in 1988.  The 
Morris worm, which was initially designed to measure the 
size of the Internet-ancestor, ARPANET, had a self-
replicating and self-propagating feature that caused 10% of 
all computers connected to the ARPANET to become 
ineffective due to the allocation of resources dedicated to 
the Morris worm [13]. 
2. Viruses 
Like Internet worms, viruses are also self-replicating 
software that can carry a malicious payload.  The 
distinguishing characteristic between worms and viruses is 
that viruses require some sort of action on the part of the 
end-user to initiate its behavior.  Viruses propagate 
through e-mails or malicious attachments, not through 
system vulnerabilities as a worm does.  Peter Szor, author 
of The Art of Virus Research and Defense, defines a 
computer virus as: 
Code that recursively replicates a possibly 
evolved copy of itself.  Viruses infect a host 
file or system area, or they simply modify a 
reference to such objects to take control and 
then multiply again to form new generations. [14] 
Viruses, like worms, have distinct characteristics and 
signatures that can be detected with an Intrusion Detection 
System (IDS).  Unfortunately, these combative methods tend 
to be reactive in nature due to the virus’ stealth nature 
and various infection methods.  Viruses can be programmed 
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to attach themselves to other executable files, self-
modify, and replicate.  The signature database associated 
with the IDS must be updated constantly and reviewed to 
ensure maximum protection. 
3. Botnets 
Another form of malware that has become more widely 
used, due to the increase in computing systems connected to 
the Internet, is a “botnet”.  A “bot” is a computer system 
that has been compromised with malicious software and the 
“net” is the network on which the infected host 
communicates.  While there are many common characteristics 
among viruses, worms, and botnets, the distinguishing 
factor for botnets is its command and control architecture.  
In this command and control architecture there is normally 
one bot that acts as the master while the other bots 
execute the commands given by the master. 
As stated earlier, the rise in computer usage and 
Internet connectivity has led to the increase in botnet 
attacks.  The most common attack associated with botnets is 
the Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack.  A DDoS 
attack is designed to overwhelm the resources of a single 
entity by sending it more requests than it can handle.  
These request normally come from multiple machines at the 
same time, which are all a part of a botnet.  However, 
botnets can be used for more than just a DDoS attack.  
According to Ellen Messmer, who published an article on the 




It’s not just DDoS attacks that are associated 
with bots.  Botnets are usually specialized, 
designed for criminal tasks that range from spam 
distribution; stealing identity credentials such 
as passwords, bank account data or credit cards 
and key-logging; click fraud; and warez (stealing 
intellectual property or obtaining pirated 
software). [15] 
Like viruses, bots that are a part of a botnet, can be 
difficult to detect.  Most bots are programmed to lay 
dormant until activated by the master bot.  When they are 
activated, the bots exhibit scanning behaviors similar to a 
worm.  The worm-like behavior makes the bot detectable with 
traffic analysis tools, such as Snort or Wireshark. 
C. PROOF OF CONCEPT FOR A MALICIOUS ACTIVITY SIMULATION 
TOOL 
The foundation for this thesis lies in the research 
started by Commander William Taff, Lieutenant Commander 
Paul Salevski, and Lieutenant Justin Neff.  Taff and 
Salevski, whose thesis “Malware Mimics for Network Security 
Assessment” described a “red team” approach to network 
training, some of the shortfalls in network security 
training for U.S. military personnel, and a proposed 
software solution that addresses some of these shortfalls 
by utilizing techniques associated with red teams.  More 
specifically, the tool they proposed and developed has the 
following characteristics [2]: 
• The tool’s architectural design is based on a 
command-and-control or server-client model.  The 
operator of the master server is the trainer, 
while the end-users are the trainees.  
Additionally, this design allows for the trainer 
to be located either locally or remotely. 
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• The tool is designed to allow users to “train as 
you fight” by executing the training on the 
users’ operational network.  All actions and 
behaviors are benign in nature, thereby causing 
no threats to the network or end-hosts.  Also, 
the network traffic generated by the system does 
not overwhelm network resources and impact users 
not involved in the training. 
• Finally, the tool is designed to capture all 
commands and actions so that a report could be 
generated to profile the training.  This is an 
important characteristic that is fundamental to 
any training scenario. 
Neff furthered Taff and Salevski’s research by 
verifying and validating their proposed approach to network 
security training.  Specifically, Neff defined various 
metrics that were used to compare MAST training approach to 
other methods of training currently available.  His 
research asserted that the MAST system is a viable approach 
and can improve network security and the IA posture of a 
unit when augmented to the other resources currently 
available [3]. 
The theses authored by Taff, Salevski, and Neff are 
the proof-of-concept and foundation upon which MAST has 
been built.  It is their work that we intend to expand and 
further develop.  
D. SUMMARY 
In this chapter, we discussed varying methods used to 
train computer network administrators.  Specifically, we 
detailed who and what red teams are, and examples of their 
implementation, along with other forms of DoD-sourced 
training.  We also discussed the malware domain and some of 
the categories of malware that fall within that domain. 
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Finally, we discussed the research and development of a 
software-based approach to training network administrators.  
In the following chapter we will expand on this software-
based approach by detailing how this approach can augment 
current training methods.  Additionally, we will provide an 
overview of MAST and describe the implementation platform 
for experimentation. 
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III. DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS AND TEST PLATFORM 
In this chapter, we detail our assumptions about the 
training objectives and training environment for which the 
Malicious Activity Simulation Tool (MAST) is to be 
implemented.  Along with these assumptions, we provide a 
detailed overview of MAST’s functionality, architecture, 
benefits over current training methods, and an example 
training scenario MAST could implement.  We conclude the 
chapter with a discussion on the Host-Based Security System 
(HBSS) and the virtual shipboard network we are using for 
testing and evaluating. 
A. TRAINING 
1. Training Objectives and Environment 
As stated in the previous chapters, the foundation for 
this thesis lies in the previous work, research, and 
development by Taft, Salevski, and Neff [2] [3].  An 
important topic they helped define and scope for this 
project is the training paradigm.  Specifically, they 
defined a training objective as “the skill or behavior that 
we wish to reinforce” [2].  This definition is a 
foundational principle of the MAST design.  Since training 
objectives vary by unit, size, location, experience, and 
numerous other factors, MAST is designed to be modular in 
nature.  MAST can be “customized” to fit varying training 
objectives. 
The implementation of MAST assumes a training 
environment where there is a trainer, trainee, safety 
observer, and computer network that is inter-connected and 
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accessible by all these individuals.  The person(s) or 
organization responsible for developing training objectives 
and overseeing the training is the trainer.  The individual 
or organization receiving the training and trying to meet 
the objectives is the trainee.  The person or organization 
responsible for the safety of the training and the 
adherence to any constraints or restraints is the safety 
observer.  Finally, the platform upon which the training is 
conducted is an inter-connected network of computers on an 
approved DoD computer network.  The computer systems 
attached to this network have a baseline computer image 
approved by its respective service or agency, and includes 
the installation of HBSS. 
2. Shortfalls of Current Training Methods 
As stated in the previous chapter, there are varying 
training methods available to network administrators for 
network security and IA.  We believe there are four major 
shortfalls with these methods that the MAST addresses: 
a. Finite Resources 
Taft and Salevski stated that the use of red 
teams for training is “the pinnacle of a unit’s training 
[13].” But unfortunately, red teams are a finite resource 
that are over-taxed and in high demand. If a unit is lucky, 
they may have an opportunity to train with a red team just 
prior to a deployment or commencement of an exercise.   
b. Non-standardized Training Methods 
As stated in the previous chapter, the attack 
methods and probing techniques used by red teams vary due 
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to factors such as experience, time available, complexity 
of the network, discovered vulnerabilities, and many more.  
These variables make standardized training with respect to 
red teams virtually impossible.  
c. Inconsistent Feedback 
The dynamic training approach and non-
standardized training methods offered by red teams can lead 
to inconsistent feedback for the unit being trained.  The 
task of capturing all events and actions is very manpower 
intensive and time-consuming.  Time and manpower are two 
resources of which the red teams do not have enough.  If 
detailed feedback is desired, then the amount and quality 
of training provided by the red team will be diminished. 
d. Different Training Platform 
While laboratory or schoolhouse type training can 
mitigate some of the issues with standardization and 
feedback, there are two issues other issues with this type 
of training: 
• First, the cost of sending personnel to be 
trained or transporting the laboratory to the 
training location can be very high.  
Additionally, the costs for managing and 
maintaining the laboratories can be very 
expensive. 
• Second, there is no guarantee that the system and 
network settings and configuration will mirror 
that of the actual network the trainees will use 
for their exercise or deployment.  
In the following sections we will discuss the benefits 
and details of the MAST and its role in the training 
domain. 
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3. Benefits of Implementing MAST 
MAST is designed to address the shortfalls mentioned 
in the previous section by providing a software-based 
solution that is realistic, repeatable, modular and 
dynamic.  MAST is designed to simulate and automate some of 
the training methods conducted by red teams.  MAST’s 
training methods, which would be available to all DoD 
personnel, can be repeated an unlimited number of times to 
ensure the training objectives are met.  One of the MAST’s 
key functions is to provide reports on the events 
surrounding a training scenario.  The reports will help a 
unit identify its strengths and weaknesses, which in turn 
will allow it to better focus its training resources.  
Finally, MAST is designed to be used on the same network 
the trainees use for their day-to-day operations.  The 
command and control design of MAST allows the trainer to 
scale the training only to those desired hosts and, most 
importantly, the training can be ceased expeditiously to 
allow trainees the ability to resume their operational 
commitments.  Finally, MAST is designed to “do no harm” to 
the network or the hosts attached to the network. 
B. MALICIOUS ACTIVITY SIMULATION TOOL (MAST) 
During Taff and Salevski’s initial research and 
prototype development of MAST, formerly known as Malware 
Mimics, it was determined that MAST be implemented 
according to a client-server paradigm [2].  As shown in 
Figure 1, the client-server paradigm allows for the trainer 
to conduct the training from a local or remote location 
using a command-and-control architecture.  Additionally,  
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there are local and remote databases for capturing actions 
on all events, and a local and remote “kill switch” to 
cease training at any time. 
 
Figure 1.   The MAST Architecture Overview 
More granular details on the system’s functionality, 
architecture, and safety measures are described below.  
Additionally, the chapter concludes with an example 
training scenario utilizing the MAST. 
1. System Functionality 
In the previous section we described how MAST fills 
the shortfalls created by the current methods of training.  
In this section we describe the functionality that exists 
within MAST to fill these voids. 
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a. Scenario Generation 
Scenario generation is an important function that 
allows for dynamic and relevant training.  As new threats 
develop, or existing threats remain persistent, it is 
critical that trainers have the ability to create unique 
situations that enforce a certain training objective.  A 
scenario is made up of commands, which are executed by the 
MAST client, and modules, which are pre-programmed 
behaviors the client will execute.  A library of modules 
will exist at all levels of the MAST and can be combined or 
used interchangeably to create unique scenarios.   
For example, if the signature of a certain piece 
of malware is to perform a network scan followed by an 
Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) echo-request 
(“ping”) out of a specific network port to a specific 
Internet Protocol (IP) address, this action can be 
recreated into multiple modules for re-use in other 
scenarios.  The scanning behavior is one module while the 
ping request is another module. 
Ideally, the creation of new modules and 
scenarios is done by the remote trainer whose experience 
and skills are equivalent to that of an ethical hacker or a 
member of a red team.  
b. Scenario Distribution 
The next important system function is scenario 
distribution.  This function is accomplished using a top-
down approach.  The trainer, from a remote location, pushes 
new scenarios, modules, or updates from the remote server, 
known as the Scenario Generation Server (SG Server) to the 
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MAST-server located locally where the training is to be 
conducted.  The local server, known as the Scenario 
Execution Server (SE Server), then pushes the updates to 
the clients as needed. 
The distribution of new scenarios or updates can 
be “pulled” or “pushed” from the respective server.  The SG 
Server can push the updates down to the SE Server, or the 
SE Server can check-in with the SG Server and determine if 
any update needs to be pulled.  The same process applies to 
the SE Server and the clients it serves. 
c. Scenario Execution 
Scenario execution occurs at all levels of the 
MAST system.  A remote trainer can execute a scenario from 
the SG Server via the SE Server co-located with the 
training unit.  For localized training, a scenario can be 
executed directly by utilizing only the SE Server.  Upon 
receipt of an execution command, the MAST Client executes 
the specified scenario. 
d. Reporting and Archiving 
Following a bottom-up approach, reporting begins 
when a MAST Client completes a given module or scenario and 
reports its actions and events to the SE Server.  The SE 
Server, with a limited database capability, archives the 
information in order to generate reports for the local or 
remote trainers.  The remote trainer, who can leverage the 
SG Server to manage multiple SE Servers, determines the 
level of granularity desired from the SE servers.  These 
reports give the trainers and leaders of the unit being 
trained a snapshot of how the trainees performed, which in 
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turn can be used to create a profile of strengths and 
weaknesses.  This will allow for a better and more 
efficient use of training resources. 
The SE Server and the SG Server have access to a 
database for data archiving.  The database is used to store 
scenarios, modules, and reports from all clients and 
servers in the system. 
2. System Architecture 
The MAST system functions mentioned above are 
implemented with the use of three main components: 
• Scenario Generation Server (SG Server) 
• Scenario Execution Server (SE Server) 
• MAST Client(s)   
All three components are Java-based software programs 
consisting of multiple classes or files designed to run on 
a variety of Microsoft Windows-based operating systems.  




Figure 2.   Logical View of MAST Architecture  
(From Greg Belli and Erik Lowney) 
3. Safety Features 
Like any military training exercise, safety is always 
a priority.  MAST provides numerous safety features to 
ensure the integrity of the network and hosts connected to 
the network. 
a. Client Check-in 
Prior to the commencement of training, each 
client or end-host participating in the training must 
check-in with the SE Server.  When the execution of a 
scenario begins, the SE Server communicates only with those 
clients on its checked-in list.  This ensures non-training 
users and end-host systems are not affected by the ongoing 
training and can perform their duties as normal. 
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b. Kill Switch 
The “kill switch” is a simple mechanism or 
command located at both the SG Server and SE Server.  This 
command, if executed, will cease all training and begin the 
roll-back module.  The “kill switch” ensures immediate and 
full access to the network and end-hosts in the event the 
users that are participating in the training need to 
immediately resume their operational duties. 
c. Roll-Back Module 
The roll-back module is similar in design to 
other training modules in that it is designed to run on the 
MAST Clients.  The main purpose is to ensure the end-host 
system being used as a MAST Client is returned to the state 
in which it was prior to the commencement of training. 
For example, if a training scenario called for 
the creation of a text file on the user’s desktop, the 
roll-back module, which is executed after the SE Server 
receives its reports, will remove or revert to original 
construct the text file and any other files created or 
modified, respectively, during the training. 
4. Modular Features 
A final characteristic about the MAST that makes it an 
extensible training tool is its modularity.  As stated 
earlier, scenarios are a combination of computer commands 
and modules.  The modules are designed to execute a single 
behavior and interact effectively with other modules.  For 
example, if a piece of malware performs multiple behaviors, 
then those individual behaviors are broken down into 
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individual modules.  The scenario created to simulate this 
malicious behavior would consist of multiple modules. 
5. A Scenario Example 
Now that we have discussed the characteristics and 
components of MAST, we can view an example of a scenario 
that can be used for training.  Figure 3 overviews the 
actions that occur when the Drive-by Download scenario is 
executed. 
In this scenario, a pop-up window appears on the 
user’s desktop.  The window is a simple image that performs 
no action other than recording the user’s response.  The 
pop-up window asks the user if they would like to execute 
or download a specific file.  The user’s actions are 
recorded in the SE Server’s database. 
The objectives of this scenario are to see how the 
users respond to the download question and if any users 
report the events to a system or network administrator. 
Such events may be characteristic of a phishing attack. The 
results of the training can let a unit know where to focus 
future training resources. 
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Figure 3.   Example of a MAST Scenario 
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C. TESTING PLATFORM 
An important aspect in the research and development of 
MAST is the platform on which the tool is tested and 
evaluated.  In an effort to create a realistic training 
environment, we have created a virtual environment that 
simulates the unclassified network of a U.S. Navy ship.  By 
using a network that simulates a real world operational 
network, we hope to validate MAST as a legitimate training 
tool for network administrators throughout the DoD.  
1. Hardware 
The computer hardware used to implement and test the 
MAST architecture is specifically designed to support 
virtualization software and the creation of multiple client 
machines.  We are using three Dell PowerEdge R610 servers 
to run VMware’s ESXi 5.0 software.  The hardware 
specifications for the Dell servers are as follows: 
• Server 1: 4 x 1TB Hard Drives, 96GB RAM, 
(2)Intel® Xeon® Quad-core 2.4GHz processors 
• Server 2: 4 x 1TB Hard Drives, 48GB RAM, 
(2)Intel® Xeon® Quad-core 2.4GHz processors 
• Server 3: 4 x 500GB Hard Drives, 24GB RAM, 
(2)Intel® Xeon® Quad-core 2.4GHz processors 
As Figure 4 shows, all three servers are connected 
using a Dell 2716 Gigabit (Gb) switch.  This configuration 
allows for full duplex communication between the servers 
and the switch.  This setup is important because the three 
servers, while physically separate, must act as one logical 
system.  The servers need to communicate with each other 
with little to no latency. 
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Figure 4.   MAST Physical Equipment Setup  
(From Greg Belli and Erik Lowney) 
Additionally, a Cisco 2811 router is used as an access 
point for remote hosts to connect to the VMs.  Finally, all 
physical resources are connected to a Dell 1920 
Uninterruptable Power Supply (UPS) to ensure protection of 
the hardware and software in the event of a power loss.  
2. Software 
The resources required to actually replicate a 
shipboard network are large and very expensive.  A more 
efficient way to validate the MASTs capabilities is to test 
the system on a virtualized network.  By using 
virtualization, we were able to reduce the amount of 
physical resources required to mock the shipboard network.  
ESXi 5.0 is a specialized operating system developed by 
 33 
VMware to manage the physical resources available on a 
server.  In our setup, we use VMware software to manage and 
create virtual machines for testing.  A virtual machine 
(VM), according to VMware, is “a tightly isolated software 
container that can run its own operating system and 
applications as if it were a physical computer” [17].   
A key element in creating and managing VMs is to 
ensure you have the appropriate amount of resources 
available for that virtual machine.  For example, if you 
create a Windows XP VM and allocate 2GB of RAM and 50GB of 
storage, then those resources will be reserved for that 
machine on the physical server itself.  There is a one-to-
one mapping with respect to a VM’s allocated memory and 
storage and the actual memory and storage on the server on 
which the VM resides. 
In the following section we discuss the actual VMs 
used for testing.  These VMs are managed by the VMware 
software and reside on the three physical servers mentioned 
above.  
3. Common PC Operating System Environment (COMPOSE) 
CG-71 Virtual Machines 
The virtual machines used to test and develop MAST are 
a replica of the U.S. Navy cruiser, U.S.S. Cape St. George, 
also known as CG-71.  The VMs, which were developed by 
Space and Naval Warfare System Center (SPAWARSYSCEN) 
Pacific contractor, ManTech, are unclassified and have the 
Common PC Operating System Environment (COMPOSE) installed.  




easier and more efficient management by network 
administrators.  The VMs provided by SPAWARSYSCEN are 
described below. 
a. Integrated Shipboard Network System (ISNS) 
Domain Controller One and Two 
Virtualized Domain Controllers One and Two (DC1 
and DC2) have Microsoft Windows Server 2003 Standard 
Edition installed.  The following services are installed as 
well: 
• COMPOSE Data Server 
• Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) 
• Domain Name System (DNS) 
• Active Directory 
• Symantec Antivirus Server 
• File and Print Servers 
b. Integrated Shipboard Network System (ISNS) 
Exchange Server 
The virtualized exchange server has Microsoft 
Windows Server 2003 Standard Edition installed.  The 
following services are installed as well: 
• Exchange Server Standard Edition 
• Internet Information Server (IIS) for Simple Mail 
Transfer Protocol (SMTP) 
• Network News Transfer Protocol (NNTP) 
c. Integrated Shipboard Network System (ISNS) 
System Management Server 
The virtualized System Management Server has 
Microsoft Windows Server 2003 Standard Edition installed.  
The following services are installed as well: 
• SQL Server 2005 Standard Edition 
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• Internet Information Server (IIS) for Simple mail 
Transfer Protocol (SMTP) 
• Network News Transfer Protocol (NNTP) 
d. Computer Network Defense-Operating System 
Environment (CND-OSE) Host-Based Security 
System (HBSS) Server 
The virtualized HBSS Server has Microsoft Windows 
Server 2003 Standard Edition installed.  The following 
services are installed as well: 
• Host-Based Security System (HBSS) Server which 
includes the ePolicy Orchestrator (ePO) 
e. Computer Network Defense-Operating system 
Environment (CND-OSE) Microsoft Structured 
Query Language (MSSQL) Server 
The virtualized MSSQL Server has Microsoft 
Windows Server 2003 Standard Edition installed.  The server 
provides a database for HBSS and Secure Configuration 
Compliance Validation Initiative (SCCVI). 
f. CG-71 Common PC Operating System Environment 
(COMPOSE) Server 
The virtualized COMPOSE Server has Microsoft 
Windows Server 2003 (32 bit) installed.  The server manages 
the COMPOSE environment. 
g. CG-71 Common PC Operating System Environment 
(COMPOSE) Secure Configuration Compliance 
Validation Initiative (SCCVI) Host 
The virtualized SCCVI Host has Microsoft Windows 
XP Professional (32 bit) installed.  The server ensures the 
COMPOSE workstations are in compliance with HBSS. 
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h. CG-71 Common PC Operating System Environment 
(COMPOSE) Workstation 
The virtualized COMPOSE Workstation has Microsoft 
Windows XP Professional (32 bit) installed.  The 
workstation is used by all users and interacts with HBSS 
through the McAfee Agent installed on the system. 
D. HOST-BASED SECURITY SYSTEM (HBSS) 
According to the Defense Information Systems Agency 
(DISA) HBSS website: 
The Host Based Security System (HBSS) baseline is 
a flexible, commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) – 
based application. It monitors, detects, and 
counters against known cyber-threats to 
Department of Defense (DoD) Enterprise. Under the 
sponsorship of the Enterprise-wide Information 
Assurance and Computer Network Defense Solutions 
Steering Group (ESSG), the HBSS solution will be 
attached to each host (server, desktop, and 
laptop) in DoD. The system will be managed by 
local administrators and configured to address 
known exploit traffic using an Intrusion 
Prevention System (IPS) and host firewall. DISA 
PEO-MA is providing the program management and 
supporting the deployment of this solution. [16] 
HBSS is currently being deployed by the DoD to 
standardize the way DoD manages networks with respect to 
security and IA.  Like the use of the COMPOSE CG-71 VMs 
mentioned in the previous section, it was important to 
implement HBSS into our testing and evaluation of the MAST.  
In his thesis, “Verification and Validation of the 
Malicious Activity Simulation Tool (MAST) for Network 
Administrator Training and Evaluation,” Neff provides a 
detailed description of HBSS and its interaction with the 
MAST [14]. 
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1. McAfee ePolicy Orchestrator (ePO) 
Serves as the central policy management point for all 
of the systems HBSS manages. 
2. McAfee Agent 
The agent is the distributed client-side software that 
communicates directly with the ePO server.  It also 
enforces all HBSS policies on the respective workstation. 
3. McAfee Host Intrusion Prevention System (HIPS) 
The HIPS is the component of HBSS that provides 
several fundamental security features, such as application 
blocking or firewalls.  The system’s functionality is 
implemented using the following features: 
a. Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) 
The IPS monitors all system and Application 
Program Interface (API) calls.  It blocks the execution of 
any program whose signature matches one of the malicious 
signatures in its database. 
b. Host Intrusion Prevention System (HIPS) 
Firewall 
The HIPS firewall protects managed hosts by 
analyzing network traffic for malicious content and 
preventing it from compromising any data, applications, or 
host operating systems. 
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c. Host Intrusion Prevention System (HIPS) 
Application Blocking 
The HIPS application blocking feature prevents 
unauthorized applications from executing or binding 
themselves to another authorized application. 
4. Device Control Module (DCM) 
The DCM restricts or limits the access of peripheral 
devices, such as thumb drives and other removable storage 
devices. 
5. McAfee Asset Baseline Module (ABM) 
The ABM, which is an extension of the ePO, conducts 
baseline scans to ensure the state of the system is 
captured.  The latest baseline scan can then be compared to 
the previous scan to determine updates or changes made. 
6. McAfee Policy Auditor (PA) 
The PA validates the integrity of a system by scanning 
and auditing the configuration settings and options of all 
systems managed by HBSS.  
7. McAfee Virus Scan Enterprise (VSE) 
The VSE allows for fast and scalable protection of the 
entire network against known viruses, worms, and other 
malicious software. 
8. McAfee Rogue System Detection (RSD) 
The RSP provides the network with multiple “eyes and 
ears” to determine if any hosts attached to the network are 
not authorized or not registered. 
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E. SUMMARY 
In this chapter we discussed some issues with current 
training methods for network administrators.  We introduced 
the characteristics and components of the MAST that address 
the training shortfalls and an example training scenario 
used by the MAST.  Additionally, we discussed the hardware 
and software used for testing and evaluating the MAST.  We 
concluded with an overview of the CG-71 VMs and HBSS.  In 
the next chapter we will describe the methodology and 
results of scalability testing with the MAST. 
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IV. SCALABILITY ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS 
In this chapter, we discuss the objectives of our 
experiment and the methodology used to determine MAST’s 
scalability properties.  Specifically, we discuss  
• the deployment of MAST on a new network  
• MAST’s impact on system and network resources 
when a scenario is executed for a varying number 
of clients participating in training, and   
• the procedure for generating and distributing all 
feedback and final reports.   
We conclude the chapter with our analysis of the 
results. 
A. MAST DEPLOYMENT AND INSTALLATION 
The objective of this assessment was to discuss the 
methodology and impact of deploying MAST from a remote 
location to a new training network that does not have MAST 
installed.  Our demonstration and analysis of the MAST 
software shows that an over-the-air (OTA) deployment and 
local installation is fast and efficient. 
1. Over-The-Air (OTA) Deployment 
Figure 5 shows an example architecture where, from a 
remote location, MAST software is pushed to a local server, 
which in turn pushes it out to all clients.  MAST 
deployment from a remote location was shown to be effective 
and efficient because of the small size of the software and 
the one-time deployment from a remote location.  The size 
of MAST software, to include the server, client, and 
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modules software, is less than 700KB.  These packaged files 
are transmitted once to the SE server, or local server, 
which in turn handles the distribution to all clients 
associated with the training network. 
Future OTA transmissions will be limited to updates or 
feedback in the form of reports and statistics pertinent to 
the training conducted. 
 
Figure 5.   Architecture for MAST deployment and 
installation. 
2. Local distribution and Installation 
Once the local (SE) server receives the software from 
the remote location, it can distribute the client software 
to all hosts on the training network.  The client software 
and training modules are less than 400KB in size.  The SE  
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server can easily deploy this software during any of 
standard updates that occur with HBSS, Microsoft software, 
or any other DoD authorized updates. 
Installation of the software on local hosts is as 
simple as placing a file on the desktop.  MAST client 
software is designed to run, or execute, only when the 
respective host is participating in training.  The software 
is resident on all hosts, but takes up very little space 
and zero system resources when not in use.  The following 
section discusses the impact on system resources when a 
scenario is executed and the software is utilized. 
B. SCENARIO EXECUTION 
The overall goal of this experiment was to determine 
how MAST uses and impacts system and network resources.  
Through a standardized set of input and procedures, we wish 
to show that MAST performs as expected when utilized in an 
environment simulating an operational network that consists 
of multiple clients in a remote location. 
1. System Resources 
For this objective, our goal was to monitor and report 
the processing resources utilized by the SE server.  It was 
critical that we understood how much of the server’s 
central processing unit (CPU) was used to serve as few as 
five clients and as many as 80 clients.  These observations 
would help us estimate and plan for testing and evaluating 
on a non-virtual operational network consisting of hundreds 
of clients. 
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2. Network Resources 
For this objective, our goal was to monitor and report 
the amount of network traffic generated between the SE 
server and clients when executing a scenario.  Since MAST 
is designed to run on a network that is not only being used 
for training, but for operational purposes as well, it was 
important we understood the impact on the network while 
conducting training.  These observations would help us 
understand the network traffic attributes of our current 
scenarios, and assist in the planning and design of future 
training modules and scenarios. 
3. Experiment Design 
In order to conduct this experiment, we used the 
hardware and software described in Chapter III, Section C.  
Specifically, we created a Windows XP Service Pack (SP) 3 
virtual machine, which hosted the MAST SE server software 
and Wireshark for network traffic monitoring.  The machine 
was configured with a 2.4 GHz Intel Xeon processor and 
Gigabit (Gbit) network adapter card.  The machine was also 
inter-connected to five COMPOSE servers and 75 COMPOSE 
workstations, each of which had the MAST Client software 
installed.  Figure 6 shows a graphical view of the 
simulated environment in which the experiment was 
conducted.  The physical setup upon which these virtual 
machines are hosted is detailed in Chapter III, Figure 4. 
One limitation identified during the creation and 
configuration of the 75 COMPOSE workstations was the impact 
of the VMs on the physical servers when all VMs were 
operational.  While the server had plenty of remaining 
memory and storage for more workstations, the creation of 
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more VMs would have been counter-productive to the 
experiment due to the workload on the physical server’s 
CPU. 
 
Figure 6.   Virtual test bed configuration 
In order to create 75 COMPOSE workstations, we created 
a template from the CG71 COMPOSE workstation VM.  That 
template was then deployed 75 times to create 75 individual 
machines.  Once all 75 were created and deployed, we 
manually updated the Internet Protocol (IP) address and 
computer name for each workstation.  This ensured there 
were no conflicts on the network and ease of registration 
with the network’s domain controllers.  Connectivity among  
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all the systems was confirmed with “ping” requests to 
neighboring systems and systems located on other sub-
networks. 
The final step in completing the experiment setup was 
to test the pre-installed scenarios’ functionality and 
correctness.  A training scenario is executed by starting 
the SE server first, followed by all of the clients 
participating in the training.  This order is critical as 
the server must be operational in order for the clients to 
“check-in.”  Once all the clients participating in the 
training are logged onto the SE server, a training scenario 
is selected from the SE server menu.  The scenario 
continues until the stop, halt, or quit command is issued. 
 
Figure 7.   MAST Scenario selection window 
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4. Experiment Methodology 
In order to determine MAST’s scalability 
characteristics, we conducted five different experiments 
using the same scenario for each evolution.  Figure 8 shows 
how we divided the MAST clients. 
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Figure 8.   Breakdown of MAST clients for experimentation 
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Each experiment followed the procedures shown in 
Figure 9.  The only difference between each experiment was 
the number of clients involved in the training. 
 
Figure 9.   Experiment procedure 
For CPU utilization analysis, we used the 
“performance” tab offered by the vSphere Client window.  
Additionally, this same tab was used to gather data on the 
network resources used during training.  A final tool used 
for analysis was Wireshark.  Wireshark captured all traffic 
traversing the network during all experiments.  We then 
applied a filter to each capture to isolate and view only 
the traffic to and from the SE server. 
The final analysis used all the above resources to 
compare the amount of network traffic generated by each 




Overall, the experiment verified system performance 
with respect to scalability.  An increase in the number of 
clients tested did not result in a similar proportional 
increase in utilization of processing resources.  
Additionally, an increase in the number of clients and 
network traffic generated to control those clients resulted 
in very minimal use of network resources. 
a. System Resources 
The performance of the computer hosting MAST 
showed limited impact as the number clients involved in the 
experiment grew exponentially. 
Figure 10 graphs shows CPU utilization for each 
experiment when a scenario was executed.  Specifically, the 
rectangles labeled with numbers show the percentage of the 
CPU’s resources used during that respective experiment.  
Experiment five for example, which connected to 80 clients 
simultaneously, utilized just over 15% of the systems CPU 
resources. 
There were some spikes and lulls depicted in the 
graph that are not associated to the experiment (3:30 – 
3:40 PM).  Analysis of the network traffic during these 
periods shows administrative communication between the 
virtual machine and the vSphere client. 
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Figure 10.   Percentage of CPU resources used for 
experiments 
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As Figure 11 depicts, an exponential increase in 
clients does not exponentially increase the amount of 
resources needed to conduct training.  MAST’s performance 
demonstrates the minimal impact on CPU resources and the 
capability to serve more clients with ease. 
 
 
Figure 11.   Percentage of CPU used compared to number of 
clients. 
b. Network Resources 
The utilization of network resources during the 
execution of all scenarios was extremely minimal.  Figure 
12 details the statistics of the network traffic generated 
during all five experiments. 
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Figure 12.   Characteristics of network during 
experiments 
The exponential increase among these 
characteristics during all experiments was expected.  
Unlike the use of CPU resources, there is a direct 
correlation between the number of clients and the amount of 
traffic generated.  An exponential increase in clients 
means a mirrored increase in network traffic to control 
those clients. 
Despite this increase in network traffic, the 
percentage of network resources used to support the 
training was very minimal.  The experimental network was 
configured to support a Gbit/sec throughput between all 
systems. 
Figure 13 provides a summary of the network 
statistics captured by Wireshark for all experiments.  The 
 54 
“captured” column details all packets captured during the 
experiment while the “displayed” column shows the details 
of network traffic directly associated with the SE server 
and our experiments. 
 
Figure 13.   Network traffic statistics captured by 
Wireshark 
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Figure 14 details the percentage of network 
resources used during each experiment.  The amount of 
traffic generated for all experiments was so low, it was 
not reported by the vSphere client.  We used our Wireshark 
captures to determine the amount and size of packets 
generated during all experiments. 
 
Figure 14.   Percentage of network resources used 
As the analysis of the network traffic has shown, 
an exponential increase does not significantly impact the 
resources available.  A correlation between the two does 
not exist.  The demonstration of the MAST design and 
implementation and the scenarios utilized assert its 
ability to have very minimal impact on a network. 
C. TRAINING FEEDBACK AND DISTRIBUTION 
The final scalability factor that we analyzed was the 
distribution of feedback and results to the SE server and 
the SG server.  As stated in the previous chapter, one of 
MASTs key functionalities is its reporting capability. 
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The method in which the SE server captures user 
actions for reports and feedback is network and system 
efficient.  MAST client software is designed to report all 
user actions to the SE server as they happen and capture 
only those actions on the local client that affect the 
state of the machine.  It captures these actions by 
documenting all changes to the system in a text file, which 
is then used as part of the roll-back module.  The roll-
back module parses the file to determine what needs to be 
done to return the system to its pre-training state.  Once 
the host is back to its original state, the text file is 
deleted. 
While training is being conducted, MAST captures all 
user actions by sending them directly to the SE server, as 
they happen, for storage in the local database.  This 
approach does increase the amount of traffic but the size 
of the traffic is very small with very minimal impact on 
network resources. 
Finally, the report to the SG server can vary based on 
the needs of the trainer or evaluator.  The SE server and 
local database can customize reports to send only high-
level statistics or compile all data into a user friendly 
text file to transmit back to the SG server.  The SG server 
can take the data and produce its own reports and diagrams. 
D. SUMMARY 
Overall, the analysis and experiment demonstrated 
MASTs ability to be deployed, scale up with little to no 




and reports with efficiency.  All the experiment objectives 
were met along with an observable validation for each 
portion of the experiment. 
Next, in Chapter V, we discuss our conclusions.  We 
also discuss our thoughts on the development of future 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
In this thesis, we showed that MAST’s use of system 
and network resources is minimal and the ability to scale 
up to train more clients will not impact other users and 
processes not participating in the training.  We also 
discussed and analyzed the method in which MAST would be 
installed on a network and the process and procedures for 
providing reports on all events and actions. 
In Chapter III, we outlined our assumptions about 
training objectives and the training environment in which 
MAST would be implemented.  We discussed the shortfalls 
with current network security and IA training methods and 
the benefits of implementing MAST to address those 
shortfalls.  We detailed MAST’s architecture and 
functionality along with an example training scenario using 
MAST.  We described and defined the hardware and software 
configurations used to test MAST’s scalability properties.   
In Chapter IV, we discussed three factors of MAST that 
are critical to scalability.  First, we discussed how MAST 
would be installed on a new network and the impact of that 
installation from a remote location.  We followed that 
analysis with a set of experiments of MAST on a simulated 
shipboard network.  The results showed that an exponential 
increase in host systems being trained did not result in an 
exponential increase in utilization of processing 
resources.  Additionally, we showed that the network 
traffic generated to control all the clients being trained  
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was minimal in size and barely noticeable when monitoring 
all network traffic.  We concluded the chapter with a 
demonstration of MAST’s reporting capabilities. 
We demonstrated that MAST can scale up to train more 
clients while minimizing the use of system and network 
resources.  Additionally, we demonstrated that MAST can be 
effectively and efficiently installed on a new network and 
provide reports and feedback as needed to meet projected 
training goals and objectives. 
B. FUTURE WORK 
1. Continued Development of Module Library 
A critical component of MAST is the modules used to 
create scenarios.  Currently, there are a limited number of 
modules that can be used for creating scenarios.  As 
discussed in Chapter II, modules are the actions or 
behaviors we program that simulate a real world threat.  
Varying types of modules are needed to ensure the training 
provided is realistic and relevant.  As malware is created 
or evolves, it is important to develop modules that 
simulate their behavior to ensure new and updated scenarios 
can be created and used. The development of such may be 
appropriate for small student projects in a network 
security course. Developing a methodology for developing 
the modules that could be exported to other organizations, 
such as the red teams units. This methodology could also be 
used to capture lessons-learned at Cyber Defense Exercises 
(CDX). 
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2. Graphical User Interface 
As the reporting functionality of MAST improves, it is 
important to maximize this value by providing a graphical 
user interface (GUI) that is informative and user friendly.  
Currently, the GUI for interaction, feedback, and results 
is limited.  Areas that will benefit from the 
implementation of a GUI include the scenario generation 
function and the reporting function. 
As the module library becomes more populated, the 
trainer will have the ability to create more scenarios that 
are unique or robust.  The manner in which these scenarios 
are created and tested can be expedited with the use of a 
GUI.  Additionally, the reporting functionality of MAST is 
critical to the feedback required for any training 
evolution.  A report GUI would allow for immediate 
feedback, which in turn can help prioritize and utilize 
training resources for future evolutions.  
3. Test and Evaluation on Operational Network 
Finally, as MAST continues to evolve, develop, and 
perform as expected in a simulated training environment, it 
is important to begin some assessments on a physical 
network.  Currently, all assessments on performed in a 
virtual environment.  Utilizing a physical environment will 
help further test and evaluate MAST’s system properties and 
scalability characteristics.  Additionally, it will allow 
for assessments of the module library and their performance 
on host systems with varying operating systems. Such 
assessments and demonstrations are critical to its 
acceptance by the operational community and its subsequent 
porting to the target objective: operational networks. 
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